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STANDING TO SUE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REDUCE 

JUDICIAL BARRIERS TO JUSTICIABILITY 

I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the pnmary concerns of the framers of the ConstitutIOn 
was the protection of states nghts agamst oppreSSIOn by a strong 
federal government. As the court system was vIewed as CruCIal to 
those nghts, one safeguard written mto the Constitution was the 
creation of federal courts with junsdictIon much more limited than 
the general junsdictIon of the state courts. Federal courts may de­
cIde only those types of cases specifically enumerated m the Con­
stitutIOn and those cases or controversIes whICh the Congress 
shall deem appropnate. 1 
Standing to sue, one aspect of federal court junsdictIon, tests 
whether a plamtiff will present hIS case with the adverseness re­
qUIred by the case or controversy clause of Article III. Standing, 
therefore, IS an exammatIon of the partIes, not the merits of the ac­
tIon. 2 A plamtiff seekmg to litigate a claIm m federal court must, as 
a prelimmary matter satisfy the court that he has standing to liti­
gate the claIm. If the plamtiff fails m thIS task, the federal court 
will not deCIde the merits of the claIm. 
Congress, m the exerCIse of its constitutional power to "limit 
and regulate"3 the junsdictIon of the federal courts, has occaSIOn­
ally attempted to modify court Imposed reqUIrements of standing. 4 
The Supreme Court has upheld these congressIOnal modifications, 
withm the narrow confines of the express language of the statutory 
standing prOVlSlons. Whether Congress may remove all standing 
barners to federal court litigation IS not clear ThIS comment, by 
lookmg at the histoncal development of the standing doctnne m 
the statutory context, and the federal courts response to that de­
1. u.s. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
2. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
4. See text accompanymg notes 22-45 and 57-65 mfra. 
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velopment, attempts to discern to what extent Congress may and 
should modify the JudicIal reqUIrements of standing. 
In cases ansmg out of an alleged VIOlatIon of plamtiff's constI­
tutIonal nghts, the United States Supreme Court has developed a 
number of reqUIrements whICh must be met before a plamtiff IS 
Judged to have standing to sue. Generally to pass the standing 
barner a plamtiff must allege mJury to himself5 or some personal 
stake m the outcome of the litIgatIon. 6 The Court has also recently 
demanded that a plamtiff show that the mJury was caused by the 
defendant's alleged illegal conduct7 or that the Court's remedial 
powers would effectively redress the plamtiff's claImed mJury 8 
These two JudiCIally Imposed reqUIrements of standing have 
fluctuated often durmg their evolution. While it IS difficult to draw 
hard and fast rules about the Court's position, it IS mstructIve to 
observe the trends m definmg standing. 
II. REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING INJURY 
A. 	 The Growth of the InjUry or Personal Stake tn the 
Outcome Ltmitatwn tn Constitutional Cases 
The Supreme Court ongmally took a restnctIve VieW of stand­
mg, requmng the federal plamtiff to show that he had suffered ac­
tual mJury ThIS reqUIrement precluded, for example, suits by 
competitors to enJom legal competitIon. 9 In Tennessee Power Co. 
v TVA, 10 a utility company challenged on due process grounds the 
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Plamtiff, an envIronmental 
group, sued to enJoin construction of resort area m natural reserve. Because 
plamtiff alleged no injury to itself or to any of its members, the Supreme Court 
demed standing. 
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Voters challenged enforcement of an ob­
solete voter apportionment statute as VIOlative of due process m that theIr votes were 
debased. Plamtiffs articulated suffiCient stake m the outcome of the litigation to 
give them standing to sue m federal court. 
7 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
8. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
9. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Owners of pnvate school 
challenged on due process grounds an Oregon statute requIrIng children under the 
age of 18 to attend public school. Society of Sisters argued that the statute hurt their 
busmess Since parents of theIr students were remOVing students because of the stat­
ute, and that the statute Interfered with the parents free chOice III determIlllng the 
educational needs of theIr children. The Court ultimately upheld the plamtiff' 
standing because it sought to protect its bUSiness agamst arbitrary, unreasonable, un­
lawful mterference rather than to enJom enforcement of proper state power. In 
dOing so, however, the Court noted that such busmess Interest m potential customers 
IS not usually suffiCient to withstand standing attack. 
10. 	 306 U.S. 118 (1939). 
73 1979) STANDING IN FEDERAL COURTS 
creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as an unlawful m­
terference with the company s busmess mterests. The Court 
denIed the plamtiff standing because damage sustamed by other 
WIse lawful competition was msufficient to mvoke the power of the 
federal courts. 11 The Court acknowledged that the legIslature had 
the power to alter the rule agamst competitor suitS. 12 Since the 
legIslature had not done so m thIs case, standing depended on the 
eXIstence of a legally protected nght, such as that founded m prop­
erty contract or tort nghts. 13 
Dunng the 1960's, the Court moved toward a less restnctIve 
VIew of standing. Rather than reqUIrmg the plamtiff to show legal 
wrong, the Court reqUIred only that the plamtiff show some per 
sonal stake m the outcome of the litigation. ThIs rule was first an­
nounced m 1962 m Baker v. Carr 14 m whICh Tennessee taxpayers 
and voters challenged an anCIent state voter apportIonment statute. 
The statute, enacted m 1901, had not been modified smce passage 
even though the population of Tennessee had grown substantially 
and had been WIdely redistributed. Plamtiffs alleged that thIS 
growth and redistribution without concomitant modification of the 
apportionment statute denIed them equal protection of the laws by 
dilutmg the value of theIr votes. 
JenkIns v. McKeithen 15 followed the Baker definition of stand­
mg. In JenkIns, a UnIon member challenged a LoUISIana statute 
creatmg a committee to mvestIgate possible cnmmal law VIOlatIons 
m labor-management relations. The plamtiff had not been mJured 
by operatIon of the statute but potentIally could have been subject 
to cnmmal prosecutIon under the statute. The Court held that thIS 
possible cnmmal prosecutIon met the Baker test of a suffiCIent 
stake m the outcome of the litigatIon to ensure the adverseness re­
qUIred by the case or controversy clause. 
Smce 1973, the Court has retreated from its positIon of le­
nIency toward standing, and now looks more toward a shOWIng of 
mJury as reqUIred m Tennessee Power Co. Four years after JenkInS 
was deCIded, the mother of an illegitImate child challenged on 
equal protectIon grounds the application of a state nonsupport stat­
ute. 16 Lmda R. S., the plamtiff, alleged that state offiCIals system­
11. [d. at 140. 
12. [d. at 141. 
13. [d. at 137. 
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
15. 395 U.S. 411 (1969). 
16. Lmda R. S. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
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atIcally refused to enforce the statute as to fathers of illegitImate 
children. Since the father of her child refused to make support 
payments, plamtiff alleged that the nonenforcement of the statute 
caused her a severe financIal burden. The Court explamed that al­
though the plamtiff had demonstrated mJury she had failed to 
show that enforcement of the statute s cnmmal sanctIon would alle­
VIate her mJury Injury alone, whICh would not be redressed by 
the remedy requested, was msufficient to meet the reqUIrements 
of standing to sue. 
In 1974, m United States v. Richardson,17 a taxpayer at­
tempted to force the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose its ex­
penditures. The taxpayer Justified hIs request under the statement 
and accounts clause of the ConstitutIon. 18 The Court held that the 
personal stake reqUIrement of Baker was the outermost limit of 
standing. To sue m federal court, a plamtiff must allege mJury set­
tIng hIm apart from the rest of the populatIon. 19 A claim by a citI­
zen, for example, that he has been mJured as a result of a tax ex­
penditure would be msufficlent, absent some specific constitutIonal 
limitatIon, to support standing to sue. 20 If the mJury bemg claimed 
IS shared by all other citizens, then the courts regard such a claIm 
to be a "generalized gnevance,"21 and, therefore, Impenmssible. 
Since 1926, the Court has fluctuated m its definitIon of stand­
mg to sue m cases brought under the ConstitutIon. From the re­
qUirement of shOWing a "legal wrong" m Tennessee Power Co. to 
the mere shOWing of mterest or personal stake m the outcome of 
17. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
18. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but In Consequence of Ap­
propnation made by Law' and regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
20. Flast Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Taxpayers sought to enJoin the expendi­
ture of federal tax funds to finance subjects In religIOUS schools. The Court held that 
because the plamtiffs alleged that the expenditures VIOlated specific limitation on 
tax expenditures contained In the Constitution (in thiS case the establishment and 
free exerCise clause), the plaintiffs as taxpayers had standing to sue. See also 
Frothmgham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
21. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Indi­
Vidual plaintiffs and an assOCiation of present and former members of the military re­
serves sued on behalf of taxpayers and citizens allegmg that the military reserve 
members of the Congress VIOlated the Incompatibility clause of the Constitution, and 
were subject to undue mfluence by the executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. As 
m Richardson, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had 
failed to allege concrete mJury setting them apart from the general population. 418 
U.S. at 180. 
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the controversy of Baker the Court has artICulated a wIde range of 
standards. Currently the Court seems to be settling on a standard 
that falls somewhat between that of Tennessee Power Co and 
Baker In reqmrmg a showmg of mJury the Court retreats from 
the personal stake standard of Baker and moves toward Tennessee 
Power Co. stoppmg short of enumeratmg the type of mJury that IS 
appropnate. 
B. 	 LegIslative Modification of the Injury Reqmrement of Standing 
The Supreme Court's stnct reqmrement that the plamtiff show 
mJury IS one limitatIon on standing. ArtICle III SectIOn 2 of the 
ConstitutIon, however empowers Congress to limit and regulate 
the JunsdictIon of the federal courts. Where Congress perceIves 
that a socIal goal IS best attamed by allowmg a Wider category of 
plamtiffs to sue to enforce the statute, it will mclude m the act a 
standing prOVlSlon mitIgatIng the Court's reqmrement. Federal 
courts, when deCIding cases ansmg under these statutes, will look 
carefully at the words of the statute and the congreSSIOnal mtent to 
deCIde whether a partICular plamtiff has standing. To ensure that 
the plamtiff IS presentmg a case or controversy overbroad standing 
will not be Implied. ThIS statutory analysIs usually results m a 
broader definitIon of standing than would be possible absent the 
statutory proVISIOn. 22 
Statutes purportmg to define standing under theIr prOVlSlons 
are of two types: Those grantmg standing to persons aggneved or 
adversely affected and those grantmg standing to any person. 
1. 	 Statutes ProVIding Standing to Persons 

Aggneved or Adversely Affected 

a. 	 Federal CommumcatlOns Act 
The Federal Commumcabons Act (FCA) provIdes that appeals 
may be taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DIStrICt of Co­
lumbia from declSlons and orders of the Federal Commumcahons 
CommIssIOn (FCC) "[b]y any other person who IS aggneved or 
whose mterests are adversely affected by any order of the CommIS-
SIOn grantmg or denymg any [relicensmg] applicatIon. "23 
22. "[I]n the absence of statute expressly confernng standing, federal plam­
tiffs must allege some threatened or actual mJury resulting from the putatively illegal 
action. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26, 41 
(1976) (quoting Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). 
23. 	 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976). 
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An early declSlon decIded under the FCA IS FCC v. Sanders 
Brothers Radio Station. 24 There, the Court m upholding the radio 
statIon s standing, noted that Congress had, when it passed the 
FCA, mtended to afford competitors a nght of actIon as the only 
partIes likely to have sufficIent mterest to challenge FCC orders. 
In 1966, the U S. Court of Appeals for the DIstnct of ColumbIa ex­
tended the reaSOnIng of Sanders Brothers to uphold FCC licensmg 
challenges by the listenmg public. In Office of Commumcation of 
the Umted Church of Chnst v. FCC 25 the plamtiff, a radio lis­
tener, objected to the relicensmg of a radio statIon. Plamtiff alleged 
that programs InvolVIng racIal discnmInatIon and denYIng the op­
portunity of responsible reply depnved the listenIng public of the 
nght to hear balanced programmIng. NotIng that the purpose of 
the statute was protectIon of the public Interest, the court found a 
nght of actIon In the plamtiff as a representatIve of that public m­
terest. 
The Federal CommUnIcatIons Act, as Interpreted by the 
courts, has removed all but the barest reqmrement of showmg m­
JUry or personal stake m the outcome of the litIgatIon. Anyone 
withIn the potentIal listenmg range of a radio statIon may mtervene 
to contest a licensmg deCISIon by the FCC. 
b. Admlmstrative Procedure Act 
The AdmInIstratIve Procedure Act IS SImilar to the Federal 
CommUnIcatIons Act In its standing prOVlSlon. It prOVIdes for suit 
by a person who suffers legal wrong or IS adversely affected or ag­
gneved by agency actIon. 26 A person seekmg JudiCIal reVIew under 
the AdmInIstratIve Procedure Act must show that hIS mJury was m­
tended to be prevented by the statute authonzIng the agency 
actIon. 
Since 1970, a number of plamtiffs have sought standing to 
challenge agency actIon under the AdmmistratIve Procedure Act. 
In Data Processmg Sermce Orgamzations, Inc. v. Camp 27 an or 
ganIzatIon of data proceSSIng vendors challenged a ruling that 
banks could sell data proceSSIng servIces to other banks and then 
customers. Data Processmg SerVICe OrganIzatIons alleged economIC 
24. 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Competing radio stations III nelghbonng town sought 
to mtervene III and contest heanng grantmg license to new radio station III 
Dubuque, Iowa. 
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). 
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
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mJury to its members who had lost contracts made prIor to the rul­
mg. The Supreme Court found that competitor mterests were 
withm the mterests sought to be protected28 by the Bank ServIce 
Corporation Act of 1962.29 Followmg the reasonmg of Sanders 
Brothers the Court upheld plamtiff's standing to sue under section 
10 of the AdmlmstratIve Procedure Act and the Bank ServIce Cor 
poratIons Act. 
The protected mterest test stated m Data Processmg was ap­
plied m Sierra Club v. Morton30 m whiCh an environmental orga­
mzatIon sued to enJom development of a resort area m a natural 
reserve. The Court held that when an orgamzatIon such as Sierra 
Club sues as a representative of its members, it must show mJury 
specifically to its members mterests,31 not mJury only to the gen­
eral public. Since Sierra Club s members had suffered no mJury 
to a protected mterest, it had no standing to assert a thIrd party 
mterest. 
Another envIronmental case, United States v. SCRAP 32 repre­
sents the hIgh water mark of standing under the AdmlmstratIve Pro­
cedure Act. There, the Court upheld the standing of students chal­
lengtng an Interstate Commerce CommIssIon (ICC) ruling refusmg 
to suspend a surcharge on railroad freIght shIpments. The students 
alleged that the surcharge discouraged the use of recycled goods by 
mcreasmg the pnce of those goods to prohibitive levels. ThIs, 
SCRAP alleged, threatened the natural resources m the 
Washmgton, DC., parks whiCh were used by the plamtiffs for rec­
reation. ICC had failed to file an environmental Impact statement 
m vIOlation of the National EnvIronmental Policy Act of 1969a3 
pnor to IssUlng the ruling. Lookmg at the alleged mJury to the stu­
dents, the Court found that although the mJury was remote and at­
tenuated, SCRAP had alleged mJury to an mterest of its members 
whiCh was arguably sought to be protected by the NatIOnal EnVI­
ronmental Policy Act of 1969. So long as the mJury even though a 
28. In Data Processmg, the Court referred to the mterests sought to be pro­
tected by the statute as the zone of mterests protected by the statute. Although the 
zone of mterests language appears m only one or two of the Supreme Court stand­
mg decIsIOns made subsequent to Data Processmg, the analYSIS employed III subse­
quent statutory standing cases follows the pattern set forth III Data Processmg. 
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976). "No bank service corporation may engage III any 
activity other than the performance of bank services for banks. Id. 
30. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
31. Id. at 734-41. 
32. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969). 
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mere trifle, IS to an mterest arguably protected by the relevant 
statute, the plamtiff has standing under the AdmImstratIve Proce­
dure Act. 34 
2. Statutes ProVlding Standing to Any Person 
a. Clean Alr Act 
Recently a number of envIronmental cases have arIsen m the 
lower federal courts under the Clean Au Act. The Clean Au Act 
grants standing to enforce emISSIon control standards to any per 
son. "35 As with statutes grantmg standing to persons aggneved or 
adversely affected, federal courts seek, m cases ansmg under these 
broad standing statutes, to determme whether the plamtiffs mter 
est IS mtended to be protected by Congress. Because these statutes 
potentIally grant nomnterested plamtiffs standing to sue, federal 
courts must examme carefully a plamtiff's claIm that he fits withm 
the meamng of the statute and the case or controversy clause. 
In Metropolitan Washtngton Coalition for Clean Alr v. Dis­
tnct of Columbta,36 the U S. Court of Appeals for the DistrIct of 
ColumbIa Circuit upheld citIzen suits under the Clean AIr Act. 
In that case, plamtiff sued under the citIzen suit prOVIsIOn of the 
Act to force closmg of an mcmerator allegedly m vIOlatIon of the 
approved clean aIr ImplementatIon plan of the Distnct of Colum­
bIa. The court noted that m the face of governmental mactIon, citI­
zen suit prOVIsIons relax the usual reqUIrements of standing and al­
low any person to sue m the public mterest as a pnvate attorney 
general. The broad standing prOVlSlons of the Clean Au Act were 
also upheld as they pertamed to a transportatIon control plan m 
Fnends of the Earth v. Carey 37 
Although the Tenth Circuit has hypothetIcally questIoned the 
standing of a New York subway nder challengmg an au pollutIon 
ImplementatIon plan m Anzona,38 the deCISIons thus far have not 
34. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14, (quoting DaVIS, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 
U. CHI. L. REV 601, 613 (1968». 
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
[Alny person may commence Civil action on hiS own behalf-(l) agaInst 
any person who IS alleged to be In vIOlation of (A) an emiSSIOn standard 
or limitation under thiS chapter or (B) an order Issued by the AdmInistrator 
or State with respect to such standard or limitation. 
Id. 
36. 511 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 

37 535 F.2d 165 (lst Cir. 1976). 

38. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116 (lOth Cir. 
1973). 
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provIded any Impediment to that type of actIOn. One commenta­
tor9 questions the constitutionality of the standing prOVlSlons of 
the Clean AIr Act. The writer concludes, however, that the tradi­
tIOnal reluctance of federal courts to entertam borderline "cases or 
controversies" must Yield to congressIOnal determmatIOn that a tra­
ditional showmg of mJury IS mappropnate. 40 
b. False Ciatms Act 
The False ClaIms Act41 provIdes that any person may bnng 
suit m hIS own behalf m the name of the United States to recover 
funds fraudulently taken from the United States. By bnngmg suit 
under thIs Act, the plamtiff-mformer IS entitled, m the court's dis­
cretion, to a reward of a portIOn of the money recovered by the 
United States. Because an mformer IS not directly mJured by the 
fraud agamst the United States, hIS sole mterest m the suit IS m 
the reward he may receIve at the conclUSIOn of the suit. 
In 1943, the Supreme Court upheld standing under the False 
ClaIms Act m United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess 42 The Court 
noted m its declSlon that mfomer s statutes, whICh proVIde for ac­
tion by a person who has no mterest m the controversy other than 
that provIded by the statute, have long eXIsted m England and thIs 
country 43 Since it IS withm the power of the legIslature to enact 
such a statute,44 the Court should not refuse to gtve effect to its 
proVIsIOns. 45 
The Court has mterpreted the case or controversy clause of 
39. Cume, JudiCial Revtew Under Federal Polution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REv 
1221 (1977). 
40. Id. at 1278. 
4l. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). The Infonner Act recodified the False Claims Act 
of 1940. Id. § 232. In 1970, the Act was amended to reqUire the plamtiff-mfonner to 
notify the U.S. Attorney General of the pending action. Id. § 232(c). The government 
has 60 days to respond, and, if it chooses, to take over prosecution of the case m the 
name of the United States. Id. An award IS precluded if the suit IS predicated on m­
fonnation m the possessIOn of the United States at commencement of the suit. Id. 
The mfonner potential reward IS reduced from 50% to 25% of the recovery if suit IS 
carned on by the mdivldual, or to 10% of the recovery, if the government prosecutes 
the suit. Id. § 232(E)(l) & (2). 
42. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
43. Id. at 541, n.4 (quoting Marvm v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905». 
44. Id. at 542. 
45. Id. at 548. The Fifth Circuit recently upheld standing under the False 
Claims Act. United States ex rei. Wemberger v. Equitax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 
1977). Infonner plamtiff alleged fraud m defendant' billing the government for ser­
vices rendered by defendant m collection of mfonnation on prospective government 
employees.ld. 
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the ConstitutIon to reqmre that a federal plamtiff ralSlng a constitu­
tIonal claIm show that he has sustaIned some personal Injury to 
withstand an attack on hIs standing to sue. OccasIOnally the Court 
has IntImated that Court-drawn reqUIrements of standing may be 
modified by Congress In its constitutIonal power to limit and regu­
late the Junsdicbon of the federal courts. Where Congress has 
acted, the Supreme Court reqUIres, at most, only a shoWIng of 
mInImal Injury to some congressIOnally protected Interest. Under 
statutes such as the Clean AIr Act's and the Informer s Acts47 
whICh allow any person to sue to enforce these statutes, the federal 
courts appear to dispense entIrely with the JudicIally Imposed re­
qUIrement of shoWIng Injury 
III. REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING CAUSATION 

OR EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDY 

A. 	 Growth of the Doctnne of Causation m 
Constitutwnal Cases 
In 1973, In Lmda R. S v. Richard D 48 the United States 
Supreme Court held that In additIon to the reqUIrement that a 
federal plaIntiff show Injury the plaIntiff must show that hIS par­
tIcular Injury could be effectIvely redressed by the federal court's 
actIon. SInce that tune, the Court has expanded thIS causatIon as­
pect of standing and used it to preclude federal litIgatIon In a 
number of situatIons. 
In 1975, varIOUS plaIntiffs sued to nullify an allegedly Invalid 
exclusIonary zonIng statute. The Court In Warth v. Seldin49 ruled 
that the plaIntiffs lacked standing to sue because they failed to 
demonstrate that theIr Injury had been caused by the allegedly ille­
gal actIon of the defendant. In the Court's words: 
[I]ndirectness of the mJury does not necessarily depnve the per­
son harmed of standing to vmdicate hIS nghts. But it may 
make it substantially more difficult to meet the mmimum re­
qUIrement of Art. III: to establish that, m fact, the asserted m­
JUry was the consequence of the defendant's actions, or that pro­
spective relief will remove the harm.50 
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (West Supp. 1979). 

47 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976). 

48. 	 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
49. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 

SO. Id. at S05. 
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In Stmon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation,51 mdi­
gents sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the CommIssIOner of 
Internal Revenue. They challenged a Treasury ruling that de­
creased the servIces whICh nonprofit hospitals were reqUIred to 
gIve to mdigents. The Court reaffirmed Warth, and held that the 
plamtiffs lacked standing because they had failed to show that the 
defendants had caused theIr mJury 
In 1978, an envIronmental group sued the mvestor-owned 
public utility engaged m constructmg a nuclear power plant, 
seekmg a declaratIOn that the liability limitatIons of the Pnce­
Anderson AtomIC Energy Act52 vIolated due process and equal pro­
tectIon. The Court m Duke Power Company v. Caroline Envtron­
mental Study Group 53 found that plamtiffs had alleged suffiCient 
mJury m the envIronmental Impact of the proposed nuclear plant 
to meet the first half of the standing test set forth m Warth and St­
mon.54 On the questIon of causatIon, the Court noted that a plam­
tiff could satIsfy the causatIon element of standing by either show­
mg, as m Warth and Stmon, that hIS mJury could be traced to the 
challenged actIon of the defendant, or by shOWing, as m Ltnda R. 
S that exerCIse of the Court's powers would effectIvely redress hIS 
claImed mJury The distnct court had found a "but for" causal con­
nectIon between the Pnce-Anderson Act and the nuclear plant con­
structIon. Because thIS finding of a causal connectIon was not 
clearly erroneous, the Court held it suffiCIent to satIsfy the causa­
tIon reqUIrement. 
51. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In Simon, the Court applied the "injUry m fact caused 
by the defendant" analYSIS to the standing question, even though plamtiffs sought 
standing under ~ 10 of the Admmlstrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.c. ~ 702 
(1976). 426 U.S. at 41. Standing under the APA would ordinarily subject plamtiffs to 
the lesser protected mterest" showmg reqUIred m cases ansmg under statutory defi­
nitions of standing. The Court m Simon did not recogmze plamtiffs as persons ag­
gneved or adversely affected under the proVISIOns of statute governmg the actions 
of the Internal Revenue ServIce. Id. The Court quoted from Lmda R. S., at least m 
the absence of statute expressly confernng standing, federal plamtiffs must allege 
some threatened or actual mJury resulting from the putatively illegal actions before 
federal court may assume Junsdiction. Id. (quoting Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). The Court applied standing analYSIS used m cases ansmg un­
der the Constitution. Under the causation articulated m Warth, plamtiffs m Simon 
failed to show either that defendants actions caused the alleged mJury or that the re­
quested relief would effectively redress plamtiffs mJury, therefore, plamtiffs lacked 
standing to sue. 426 U.S. at 44-45. 
52. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2210 (1976). 
53. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
54. Id. at 72. 
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Before 1976, the Court reqUIred that the plamtiff show either 
a personal stake m the outcome of the litIgatIOn55 or mJury m 
fact. 56 Warth and S,mon added a causatIon aspect to the JudicIally 
Imposed mJury reqUIrement of standing. The Duke Power case em­
phasIzed that the causatIon reqUIrement could be satIsfied by eI­
ther a shoWing that plamtiff's mJury was traceable to defendant's 
actIon or that the mJury would be redressed by the remedy sought. 
B. 	 Dealing with Causation or Effectweness of 
Remedy Through LegIslation 
The causatIon reqUIrement, artIculated m Ltnda R. S Warth, 
Simon and Duke Power does not present a barner to standing to 
sue m cases ansmg under statutory grants of standing. In 
artICulating the reqUIrement of standing, the Warth Court held 
that while federal courts could only act where the plamtiff's mJury 
could be traced to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant, 57 
thIS causatIon requrrement could be modified by Congress. 58 
One of the petitIoners m Warth, Metro Act, a public Interest 
group concerned with ralSlng conSCIOusness toward problems of 
discnmmation m housmg, represented a group of resIdents of 
Penfield, New York. These members alleged mJury from Penfield's 
exclusIOnary zonmg poliCIes because they were bemg demed the 
benefits of livmg m a racIally and ethmcally mtegrated community 
The Supreme Court recogmzed that for an assocIatIon to have 
standing to sue as a representatIve of its members, it must assert a 
distmct mJury to itself or to one or more of its members. 59 While 
admittmg that the demal of the benefits of livmg m an mtegrated 
community mIght constitute suffiCIent mJury for standing under the 
FaIr Housmg Act60 as mterpreted m Trafficante v. Metropolitan 
55. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614 (1973). 
56. Schlesmger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
Lmda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Jenkms v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Tileston Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
57. 	 422 U.S. at 499. 
58. 	 Id. at 500. 
59. 	 Id. at 511. 
60. The Fair Housmg Act IS typical of the statutes granting standing to person 
aggneved or adversely affected under its provIsIOns. The Fair Housmg Act provides 
that on failure of admmlstrative remedy, any person aggneved by discnmmatory 
housmg practice may commence suit m United States distrIct court. 42 U.S.C. § 
3610 (1976). 
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Life Insurance Co. 61 the Court m Warth held that thIs mJury 
would not suffice when allegmg a constitutIonal vIOlatIon.62 
In Trafficante one black and one white tenant of an apart­
ment building sued theIr landlord, allegmg mJUry m bemg demed 
the advantages of livmg m an mtegrated neIghborhood. Although 
neither plamtiff had been discnmmated agamst by the landlord, 
the Court held that plamtiffs had alleged sufficIent mJury to bnng 
them withm the scope and mtent of the Act. JustIce White, m hIs 
concurnng opmIOn, satd that absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
he would be unable to conclude that petitIoners complamt pre­
sented a case or controversy 63 Thus, the Court IS willing to gIve 
effect to express statutory language definmg standing to sue under 
the Act's prOVISIOns. 
A recent declSlon of the Court extends Trafficante to the situ­
atIon presented m Warth. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood,64 reSIdents of Bellwood, IllinOIS, and the town itself 
sued two real estate agenCieS m the town for steermg white clients 
toward white areas of the town, and black clients toward mtegrated 
areas of the town. RacIal steenng of thIS type created raCIal 
Imbalance m Bellwood's housmg situatIon, and depnved the mdi­
VIdual plamtiffs of the benefits of livmg m an mtegrated commu­
nity The platntiffs brought suit under sectIon 812 of the FaIr 
Housmg Act, argumg that the person aggneved or adversely af­
fected language of sectIon 810 should be read mto sectIon 812, 
whICh IS silent on the questIon of who has standing to sue under its 
provlSlons. The Court found the plamtiffs argument persuaSIve m 
light of the legIslatIve hIstory of the FaIr Housmg Act. 65 
No language m Trafficante or Gladstone refers to the causa­
tIon element where standing IS claImed under the language of a 
statute. The ImplicatIon from the results m these cases and Warth 
IS that where Congress clearly mtends to prOVIde standing to a 
class of plamtiffs, that mtent will not be thwarted by JudiCIally 
Imposed rules govermng standing. Language m Warth taken m 
connectIon with the declSlons m Trafficante and Gladstone mdi­
cates that the Warth plamtiffs would have had standing to sue un­
der the FaIr Housmg Act. The error committed by the Warth 
61. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See text accompanymg note 63 mfra. 
62. Id. at 514. 
63. ld. at 212. 
64. 99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979). 
65. ld. at 1609-13. 
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plamtiffs was m relymg solely on constitutIonal clalms. The Judi­
clally lmposed causation aspect of standing to sue lS allevlated by 
statute even though there IS no specific language m the statute 
dealing with the causatIon aspect. CongressIOnal mtent to define 
the level of mJury necessary to allow suit IS sufficlent also to re­
move the reqmrement of shoWlng that plamtiff's mJury was caus­
ally related to the defendant's illegal actIon, or that exerClse of the 
court's remedial power would effectIvely redress pi am tiff' s mJury 
IV CONCLUSION 
Standing to sue, as a rule of JustIclability grew out of the case 
or controversy clause of the ConstitutIon. To constitute a case or 
controversy lssues before the federal court must be couched with 
specificity and adverseness. 66 When a defendant questIons a plam­
tiff's standing to sue, he raises doubt about the plamtiff's ability to 
present adequately a concrete, adverse positIon before the court. 
Ongmally to have standing, a plamtiff had to aver some mJury 
to a legally protected mterest. 67 ThlS reqmrement of legal mJury 
was softened somewhat durmg the slXtIes by a number of Supreme 
Court declSlons whIch held that a personal stake m the outcome of 
the litIgatIon was sufficlent to supply the adverseness demanded by 
the case or controversy clause. 68 Thls personal stake standard for 
standing to sue was hailed as a new day m federal litIgatIon, 
removmg all but the least mtruslve of barners to standing to sue. 69 
Recent declsIOns m cases ansmg under the ConstitutIon, how­
ever, have erected a number of new standing barners to suit m the 
federal courts. The personal stake reqUlrement artIculated m the 
Baker case has been supplanted by a stnct reqUlrement of shoWlng 
actual mJUry to the plaIntiff.70 In additIon, a reqmrement that the 
plamtiff show that hls partlCulanzed, actual mJury be causally re­
lated to the defendant's putatIvely illegal act, or that hls mJury be 
redressed by the court's remedial actIon has been thrust upon the 
federal plamtiff. 71 A showmg of causatIon goes beyond the mitIal 
mqUlry of JustIciability mto the fitness and ability of plamtiff to 
carry on a suit as an adverse party to defendant. To reqUlre a 
66. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
67. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938). 
68. See text accompanymg notes 14 & 15 supra. 
69. Monaghan, Constitutional AdjudicatIOn: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 
1363 (1973). 
70. See text accompanymg notes 16-21 supra. 
71. See text accompanymg notes 48-54 supra. 
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plamtiff to show causatIon IS to reqUIre him to prove his case be­
fore entenng the courtroom. If, as the Court itself has srud, stand­
mg speaks to the nature of the parties to a case and not to the mer 
its of the action, the causation element of standing cannot be 
Justified, and should be elimmated. 72 
Congress, under Article III of the Constitution, has the power 
to limit and regulate the JunsdictIon of the federal courts. Some 
legislatIOn IS most easily effectuated by suit by a broad category of 
plamtiffs. It IS not practical, for exrunple, for Congress to set up 
watch dog committees to monitor every possible abuse of environ­
mental standards throughout the country Much environmental 
litigation occurs because concerned citizens notify the federal 
regulatory agencies of abuses takmg place. To facilitate the Imple­
m;nlatIOn of its poliCies, Congress provides for a broader than nor 
malcategory of plamtiffs to sue to enforce the statute. 
While the Court has severely limited federal litigatIOn ansmg 
under the Constitution, it seems amenable to broad definition of 
classes of federal plallltiffs havmg standing to sue under federal 
statutes. 73 The mJury and causation reqUIrements defined by the 
Court all but disappear where congressIOnal mtent to broaden the 
allowable category of plruntiffs IS clear The extent to whICh Con­
gress can exercise that power IS unclear It IS clear that Congress 
may pass statutes like the Informer s Acts whICh prOVIde the only 
mterest a plamtiff has m the litIgatIon. 74 It IS also clear that Con­
gress need not specially deal with the causation element of stand­
mg to sue so long as the mtent to mclude a broad category of 
plamtiffs IS clear 75 
One commentator76 has suggested that Congress could pass a 
statute providing that any citizen or reSident of the United States 
has an lllterest m the frur mterpretatIon and admlll1stratIon of the 
laws and Constitution of the United States, and that any potential 
VIOlation of those statutes or Constitution creates lllJUry III the citi­
zen or reSident. Any citizen or reSident, therefore, has lllJUry suffi­
72. As stated by Mr. Justice Brennan In hIS dissent In Warth to reqUIre plaIn­
tiffs to show causation IS "to reqUIre them to prove theIr case on paper In order to 
get Into court at all, reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured In the federal 
courts. 422 U.S. at 528. 
73. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S. Ct. 1601 (1979); 
United States v. SCRAP 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
74. See text accompanymg notes 41-45 supra. 
75. See text accompanyIng notes 57-65 supra. 
76. Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An AnaLYSIS and Some Proposals 
for LegIslative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REv 863 (1977). 
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clent to have standing to sue to challenge the mterpretatlOn or ad­
mmistratIon of the laws and the Constitution of the United States. 
Whether thIs type of all purpose standing statute would withstand 
a constitutional challenge IS not clear Statutes with a sImilar effect 
m narrow areas of the law such as the Clean Au Act and the In­
former s Acts have been upheld, but these statutes have not been 
tested to the full boundanes of theIr language. Furthermore, it 
may not be prudent to open up the federal courts to suits by par 
ties who are less than actively mterested m the outcome of the liti­
gation. Certamly to the extent that a nomnterested or nonadverse 
party attempts to mvoke the Junsdiction of the federal courts, he 
may be barred by other aspects of JusticIability such as collusIve­
ness or npeness. These limitations, however, do not completely 
supplant the standing aspect of federal court JunsdictlOn, and may 
therefore, not adequately limit the Junsdiction of the federal 
courts. 
Perhaps rather than provIde for umversal standing to all per 
sons m all areas of federal litigation, it would better serve the pur 
poses of Congress and the public to broaden the ability of public 
mterest groups to sue to enforce the prOVlSlons of federal statutes. 
Public mterest groups like Sierra Club, while not mJured by a par 
ticular envuonmental law mfraction, represent a category of plam­
tiffs who will adequately and vIgorously represent the Views of par­
ties who are m fact mJured by the illegal action. There IS no harm 
m allowmg these groups to act as pnvate attorneys general to rep­
resent the mterests of mJured partieS m theu area of expertise. 
The Court has often differentiated between constitutional limI­
tations on standing and "prudential rules" of standing governmg ac­
tlOns brought by partIes seekmg to assert the nghts or legal mter­
ests of others to obtam relief for mJury to themselves. 77 Rather 
than passmg statutes broadenmg the definition of mJury whICh has 
been labelled a constitutional limitation of standing, and nskmg m­
validation as exceeding the case or controversy clause, the Con­
gress should concentrate on reducmg the Court Imposed prudential 
rules of standing. Furthennore, the Congress mIght urge a return 
to the Baker standard, whICh reqmred the plamtiff to show a per 
sonal stake m the outcome, m dealing with suits arlSlng under 
United States statutes. ThIS approach would assure the mtegrity of 
the case or controversy clause while producmg a broad effectuation 
of congresslOnal mtent. 
Anne M Cohen 
77. 422 U.S. at 509. 
